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TO OKH/OP. ABT. AND TO OKH/FOREIGN ARMIES EAST, FROM ARMY GROUP SOUTH IA/01, NO. 411/43, SIGNED VON WEICHS, GENERAL FELDMARSCHALL, DATED 25/4:- COMPREHENSIVE APPRECIATION OF THE ENEMY FOR 'ZITADELLE' IN THE MAIN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ENEMY REMAINS THE SAME AS REPORTED IN ARMY GROUP SOUTH (ROMAN) IIA, NO. 0477/43 OF 29/3 AND IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPRECIATION OF 15/4. THE MAIN CONCENTRATION, WHICH WAS ALREADY THEN APPARENT ON THE NORTH FLANK OF THE ARMY GROUP IN THE GENERAL AREA KURSK--SSUDSHA--VOLCHANSK--OSTROGOSHSK, CAN NOW BE CLEARLY RECOGNISED: A FURTHER INTENSIFICATION OF THIS CONCENTRATION IS TO BE EXPECTED AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUOUS HEAVY TRANSPORT MOVEMENTS ON THE LINES YELETS--KASTORNOYE--KURSK, AND POVORINO--SVOBODA AND GRYAZI--SVOBODA, WITH A PROBABLE (B% INCREASE) IN THE AREA VALUIKI--NOVY OSKOL--KUPYANSK. AT PRESENT HOWEVER IT IS NOT APPARENT WHETHER THE OBJECT OF THIS CONCENTRATION IS OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. AT PRESENT, (B% STILL) IN ANTICIPATION OF A GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON BOTH THE KURSK AND MIUS DONETZ FRONTS, THE ARMOURED AND MOBILE FORMATIONS ARE STILL EVENLY DISTRIBUTED IN VARIOUS GROUPS BEHIND THE FRONT AS STRATEGIC RESERVES. THERE ARE NO SIGNS AS YET OF A MERGING OF THESE FORMATIONS OR A TRANSFER TO THE FORWARD AREA (EXCEPT FOR (ROMAN) II GDS [GUARDS] ARMOURED CORPS) BUT THIS COULD TAKE PLACE RAPIDLY AT ANY TIME. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM A SURE SOURCE THE EXISTENCE OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF THE STRATEGIC RESERVE CAN BE PRESUMED:- A) 2 CAVALRY CORPS (III GDS AND V GDS IN THE AREA NORTH OF NOVOCHERKASSK). IT CAN ALSO BE PRESUMED THAT 1 MECH [MECHANISED] CORPS (V GDS) IS BEING BROUGHT UP TO STRENGTH HERE. B) 1 MECH CORPS (III GDS) IN THE AREA (B% NORTH) OF ROWENKI. C) 1 ARMOURED CORPS, 1 CAVALRY CORPS AND PROBABLY 2 MECH CORPS ((ROMAN) I GD ARMOURED, IV CAVALRY, PROBABLY (B% (ROMAN) I) GDS MECH AND V MECH CORPS) IN THE AREA NORTH OF VOROSHILOVGRAD. D) 2 CAVALRY CORPS ((B% IV) GDS AND VII GDS) IN THE AREA WEST OF STAROBYELSK. E) 1 MECH CORPS, 1 CAVALRY CORPS AND 2 ARMOURED CORPS ((ROMAN) I GDS (B% MECH), (ROMAN) I GDS CAVALRY, (ROMAN) II AND XXIII ARMOURED) IN THE AREA OF KUPYANSK--SVATOVO. F) 3 ARMOURED CORPS, 1 MECH CORPS ((ROMAN) II ARMOURED, V GDS ARMOURED, (B% XXIX) ARMOURED AND V GDS MECH UNDER THE COMMAND OF AN ARMY (PERHAPS 5 ARMOURED ARMY)) IN THE AREA OF OSTROGOSHSK. G) 2 ARMOURED AND 1 CAVALRY CORPS ((ROMAN) II GDS ARMOURED, III GDS ARMOURED AND VI GDS CAVALRY) UNDER THE COMMAND OF AN UNIDENTIFIED H.Q., IN THE AREA NORTH OF NOVY OSKOL. IN THE EVENT OF 'ZITADELLE', THERE ARE AT PRESENT APPROXIMATELY 90 ENEMY FORMATIONS WEST OF THE LINE BELGOROD--KURSK--MALOARKHANGELSK. THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP WILL ENCOUNTER STUBBORN ENEMY RESISTANCE IN A DEEPLY ECHELONED AND WELL DEVELOPED MAIN DEFENCE ZONE, (WITH NUMEROUS DUG IN TANKS, STRONG ARTILLERY AND LOCAL RESERVES) THE MAIN EFFORT OF THE DEFENCE BEING IN THE KEY SECTOR BELGOROD--TAMAROVKA. IN ADDITION STRONG COUNTER ATTACKS BY STRATEGIC RESERVES FROM EAST AND SOUTHEAST ARE TO BE EXPECTED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORECAST WHETHER THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW FROM A THREATENED ENCIRCLEMENT BY RETIRING EASTWARDS, AS SOON AS THE KEY SECTORS [LITERALLY, 'CORNER-PILLARS'] OF THE BULGE IN THE FRONTLINE AT KURSK, BELGOROD AND MALOARKHANGELSK, HAVE BEEN BROKEN THROUGH. IF THE ENEMY THROWS IN ALL STRATEGIC RESERVES ON THE ARMY GROUP FRONT INTO THE KURSK BATTLE, THE FOLLOWING MAY APPEAR ON THE BATTLE FIELD:- ON DAY 1 AND DAY 2, 2 ARMOURED DIVISIONS AND 1 CAVALRY CORPS. ON DAY 3, 2 MECH AND 4 ARMOURED CORPS. ON DAY 4, 1 ARMOURED AND 1 CAVALRY CORPS. ON DAY 5, 3 MECH CORPS. ON DAY 6, 3 CAVALRY CORPS. ON DAY 6 AND/OR DAY 7, 2 CAVALRY CORPS. SUMMARIZING, IT CAN BE STATED THAT THE BALANCE OF EVIDENCE STILL POINTS TO A DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY: AND THIS IS IN FACT UNMISTAKABLE IN THE FRONTAL SECTORS OF THE 6 ARMY AND 1 PANZER ARMY. IF THE BRINGING UP OF FURTHER FORCES IN THE AREA BEFORE THE NORTH WING OF THE ARMY GROUP PERSISTS AND IF A TRANSFER FORWARD AND MERGING OF THE MOBILE AND ARMOURED FORMATIONS THEN TAKES PLACE, OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS BECOME MORE PROBABLE. IN THAT CASE IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THE ENEMY CAN EVEN THEN FORESTALL OUR EXECUTION OF ZITADELLE IN THE REQUIRED CONDITIONS. PROBABLY ON THE OTHER HAND WE MUST ASSUME COMPLETE ENEMY PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE, INCLUDING THE COUNTER ATTACKS OF HIS STRONG MOT [MOTORISED] AND ARMOURED FORCES, WHICH MUST BE EXPECTED. (BY PERMISSION OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, COLOSSUS: THE SECRETS OF BLETCHLEY PARK'S CODE-BREAKING COMPUTERS BY COPELAND (2006) 787W FROM PP.5-6)